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: Locking in Wedlock

LOCKING IN WEDLOCK: RECONCEPTUALIZING MARRIAGE
UNDER A PROPERTY MODEL
Ruth Sarah Lee*
1. INTRODUCTION

In a world of completely static, rational men and women, the ability to
end a marriage with divorce can be mathematically proven to be completely
unnecessary.' However, where men and women do not meet this assumption-but
are instead dynamic, complex beings brimming with the vicissitudes of hopes,
passions, and multifaceted views on morality-we must look beyond a single

algorithm. Without compressing the workings of marriage into a single equation,
legal academics have nonetheless applied economic rhetoric, formulating that

"ultimately one's value on the marriage market is determined by the market, or,
more precisely, by the parties on the other side of the market. ' ,2 But clearly the
market only captures the very first step of marriage-after all, the wedding marks a
beginning, not an ending.3
In the way that the idea of life is entwined with the idea of death, our

conception of marriage has always been intricately intertwined with our conception
of divorce.4 Many commentators have examined the way our divorce laws both

J.D. Candidate, 2012, Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank Henry E. Smith and John
*
C.P. Goldberg for their feedback, inspiration, patience, and suggestions, and for otherwise existentially
representing the best aspects of the legal academy. Thank you for making this happen. I am also appreciative of all
my colleagues involved in the Spring 2011 Private Law Workshop at Harvard Law School, as well as our guest
speakers, including Kenneth Simons, Andrew Kull, Richard Brooks, James Penner, Charles Fried, Seana Shiffrin,
Thomas Merrill, and Brian Lee. All errors remain my own.
See generally DAN GUSFIELD & ROBERT W. IRVING, THE STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: STRUCTURE
I.
AND ALGORITHMS (1989). Given a set of n men and n women, marry them off in pairs after each man has ranked
the women in order of preference from I to n, and each woman has done likewise. If there does not exist any
alternative pairing of any two individuals such that both are better off than they would be with the individuals to
which they are currently matched, then the Stable Marriage Problem has been solved. See also David Gale &
Lloyd Shapley, College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, 69 AM. MATHEMATICS MONTHLY 9-15 (1962)
(proving through the Gale-Shapley Algorithm that for any number of men and women, it is always possible to
solve the "Stable Marriage Problem" and avoid any elopements).
16 J.
2.
Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce,and Quasi Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life,"
LEGAL STUD. 267,278 (1987).
3.
Cf id. at 287.
[observing that] at the time of formation, the marriage contract promises gains to both the
parties who enter into it. Yet the period of time over which these gains are realized is not
symmetrical .... The creation of this long-term imbalance provides the opportunity for
strategic behavior whereby one of the parties, generally the man, might find it in his interest
to breach the contract unless otherwise constrained.
4.
See, e.g., Catherine T. Smith, PhilosophicalModels of Marriage and their Influence on Property
Division Methods at Divorce, II J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 214 (2000).
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reflect and contour the way we should imagine marriage in law, each with its own
nuances and corollaries. 5 In this pursuit, commentators have modeled marriage
after; inter alia, a governance, 6 a commitment, 7 a status, 8 a tort-doctrine-like
duty,9 a promise,'0 and most popularly in recent discussions, a contract" or a
partnership. 2 Commentators have chosen to oscillate between these different
conceptions largely in response to the different ways divorces were obtainable over
Western history.
From the Renaissance to the present, the pattern has been expansion: divorce
grew from unavailable, to available upon a showing of fault,' 3 to becoming
available without any requirement of fault. 14 These changes, in part, pushed
marriage from the more traditional conceptions of a commitment/governance into
more topical conceptions such as a contract or a partnership. While the contract or
partnership theories of marriage have served well in explaining many aspects of
modem divorce law, commentators have also expressed some frustration with the
The method of property division selected for divorce also informs us about how the
jurisdiction views the marriage relationship independently of divorce. That jurisdictions
have moved from "title" to "equitable distribution" or "equal distribution"--like concurrent
movements from fault-based to no-fault divorce-gives evidence of deeper changes in their
concepts of the marital relationship and of the roles of marital partners.
5.
See id. at 215 ("We should expect a state's philosophical model of marriage to influence the method it
selects for property division on divorce.").
6.
See, e.g., Smith, supranote 4, at 214-15 (contrasting the concept of marriage as a monarchy with that
of marriage as a democracy).
7.
Id. at 215.
8.
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 2, at 269 n.2.
There has been much discussion in the legal literature of whether marriage is best
understood as a contract relation or, alternatively, as a status relation. Some commentators
have argued that ... the relationship is truly one of status rather than contract ....

The legal

distinctions between status and contract need not inhibit the present discussion of the
contractual aspects of marriage.
See also BARBARA A. BABCOCK, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE AND THEORY 564 (1st

ed. 1978).
9.
See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and PropertyRhetoric, 82
GEO. L.J. 2303, 2312 (1994).
The most coherent of these was the theory that a husband who had breached the marital
contract sufficient to warrant a divorce should not be permitted by his own wrong to escape
his obligations under that contract. The husband's misconduct might be regarded as a breach
of duty that constituted tortious behavior.
10.
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, The Effect of Conflicting Moral and Legal Rules on
Bargaining Behavior: The Case of No-Fault Divorce, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 315, 318 (2008) (using the general
rhetoric of marital contracts, but also noting that "one way to think about marital wrongdoing is as a moral
transgression... breaking a promise.").
I.
See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriageas RelationalContract, 84 VA. L. REv. 1225
(1998).
12.
See, e.g., Regan, supra note 9, at 2314.
13.
Smith, supra note 4, at 217; see also Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and
Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 875-76 (1994); Cohen, supra note 2, at 274-77; Scott & Scott, supra note
11, at 1234; Betsey Stevenson, The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-SpecificCapital, 25 J. LAB. ECON. 75,

78-81 (2007).
14.
See, e.g., Regan, supra note 9, at 2312 ("The conception of alimony as the payment of damages by a
breaching husband exerted an influence until the recent dramatic changes in divorce law beginning in the 1970s.").
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limitations of these models. 15 A new framework is warranted. This article begins
by tracing the evolution of divorce law as a way to understand the evolution of the
way society has come to understand marriage. It also presents the changing ways of
conceptualizing the remedy of alimony as a response to the different models of
marriage.
Part III briefly sets out an overview of property rights in general and extracts
four lessons to learn from applying the property framework to marriage. Then,
given that a property right exists, it analyzes the different rules of protections that
may be applied-whether a property rule or a liability rule-and discusses the
proper rule to apply to marriage and its consistency with the property model.
Part IV discusses reasons why a property model would be more consistent with
our conception and treatment of marriage and divorce as compared to other
models. By conceptualizing marriage as property, it allows us to visualize changes
in the regime as a gradual shift from inalienability to alienability, rather than
completely switching models. Then the article offers a discourse on the problems
with contractual and partnership conceptions of marriage. It describes several ways
that traditional aspects attributed to property rights complement our conception of
marriage, including the personhood aspect of property that is seldom found in
contracts. Marriage also lacks the clear articulation of bargained-for conditions that
characterizes contract law. Lastly, this article explores three divorce cases that
employ three different remedial tools to conclude that a property framework is not
only more sensitive toward the personal aspects of divorce but is a more accurate
reflection of what courts are doing in practice.
This article will not offer comprehensive consideration of pre-nuptial
agreements because "market alternatives to legal institutions, such as prenuptial
contracts, [are not] an effective means of protecting spouses from inefficient
breaches of the marriage contract."' 6 This sentiment has been echoed by other
commentators. 7 Lastly, this article should not be misread to suggest that the
spouses become each other's property to control and maintain, nor does it refer to
the right to marry. The "property model" referred to will always mean that the
marriage itself, once eventuated, is property held individually by each spouse.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF DIVORCE LAW AND THE WAY WE IMAGINE

MARRIAGE

The way marriage has evolved in the Western world can be summarized
through three main iterations. In the ancient world, marriage was primarily
independent of any notions of love, but used in history, politics and money. During
this period, divorce was originally available in Ancient Greece and Rome but was
then abolished by the Christian church for about sixteen hundred years.1 8 Also
15.

See infra Part I11.

16.
Cohen, supra note 2, at 268.
17.
See, e.g., Ryznar, infra note 57, at 145 ("However, premarital agreements are hardly the perfect
remedy, particularly when their enforceability is in doubt.").
18.
See infra Part I.A.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2012

3

Barry Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4

Barry Law Review

Vol. 17, No. 2

during this period, where divorce was generally unavailable, alimony was
9
considered a "continuing obligation" of marriage.
In the mid-nineteenth century, divorce became gradually available for
aggrieved spouses and the ideals of marrying for love began to take root.20 During
this time, alimony stopped being an obligation from marriage and became payment
for fault or breach.
21
Lastly, in the period following 1970, no-fault divorces came to prominence.
Under this scheme, alimony, or spousal payments, can no longer be seen as either a
continuing obligation (the marriage has dissolved), nor as punishment (hence "nofault"), but requires a new justification, which this article aims to address.
A. Pre-1800s: The Indissoluble Model of Marriage
1. Historical Development toward an Indissoluble Model of Marriage
Although it is easy to conceptualize the Western history of divorce as a oneway movement-that is, we start from the canonical no-divorce model and
progress toward increasingly available divorces-it would be disingenuous not to
mention that further back in time, divorce did flourish in Ancient Europe. In
Ancient Rome, marriages were de facto rather than de jure, and divorce was
actually quite available to either party and evidently exercised regularly among the
upper social classes. 22 Marcus Porcius Cato, for example, divorced his wife and
arranged for her to marry one of his friends "in order to strengthen the friendship
and family connections between the two men," then promptly remarried her after
his friend died.23 Love was sometimes involved but not a necessary ingredient.24
The move from commonly-accepted divorces toward a permanent notion of
marriage came very slowly. In fact, the "post-Constantine Roman legislation did no
more than threaten to punish a husband who repudiated his wife without cause"
and in A.D. 542 when Byzantine Emperor Justinian tried to "extend penalties to
consent, [it] was so unpopular that it was promptly repealed by
divorce by mutual
25
his successor.,
Marriage became "indissoluble only when, after centuries of striving, the
Church gained jurisdiction for its own courts over matrimonial causes., 26 For
the first "sixteen hundred years of the Christian era[,]" marriage remained

19.

Id.

Id.
20.
See infra Part lI.B.
21.
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE
22.
UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 17 (1989) (citing H.F. JOLOWiCZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 113 (2d ed. 1967)).
STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: How LovE CONQUERED MARRIAGE n.27 (2005).
23.
24.
Id. at ch. I ("The great Roman statesman Cicero exchanged many loving letters with his wife, Terentia,
during their thirty-year marriage. But that didn't stop him from divorcing her when she was no longer able to
support him in the style to which he had become accustomed.").

25.

Idat 17.

26.

GLENDON, supra note 22.
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indissoluble.27 With only a few exceptions, marriage was permanent, regardless of
abuse, fault, irreconcilable differences, or anything else short of death. 28 Although
colloquially, one might view this eternal bond as somewhat romantic, that would
be a misconception of the times. Up to the eighteenth century, "it was generally
held that passionate sexual love between spouses within marriage was not only
indecent, but positively sinful," and that "nothing is more impure than to love one's
wife as if she were a mistress; . . .men should appear before their wives not as
lovers but as husbands. 2 9
Rather than revolving around ideals of eternal love, the move toward the
abolition of divorce has generally been described as a story about religion and land.
For example, one account describes the historical movement in the following way:
Thus matters continued, the clergy, and then the ecclesiastical
courts, arrogating to themselves the decision of all matters relating
to marriage, and proceeding, on the ground that marriage was a
sacrament ordained by the Saviour, to argue that being a sacrament
it must be held to be indissoluble. And, indeed, the indissolubility
of the marriage contract was upheld by the law of England from
the earliest time of which we have record.3 °
Today, commentators have recognized economic benefits arising from this
religious view. Lloyd Cohen, for example, has acknowledged that "the religious
nature of marriage and the religious consciousness of the people who have
participated and sanctioned the institution" have acted as an informal, rather than
legally formal, method of protecting a wife's quasi-rents and preventing
inefficiently strategic behavior.31 It was also a practical way to keep land within
particular families.32
In addition to examining the driving societal forces that guided the Western
world toward this conception of marriage, academics have analyzed the
psychological and personal implications of this time period:
This model of marriage transformed the individuals entering the
marriage into one person. The model promoted the concept of the
family as a single unit headed by the husband .... The individual
legal rights enjoyed by a woman prior to a marriage were vested in
her husband; thus, as a wife she could not own property or make
contracts.... Property was not held individually by husband and
27.
Brinig & Crafton, supranote 13, at 875.
28.
Martha Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of
Rhetoric and Results in the Regulations ofthe Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789, 799 (1983).
29.

LAWRENCE STONE, THE PAST AND THE PRESENT REVISITED 347 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting St. Jerome,

quoting Seneca).
30.

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 282 (Herbert Broom & Edward

A. Hadley ed., John D. Parsons Law Book Publisher 1875) (1765).
31.
Cohen, supra note 2, at 289.
32.
See Brinig & Craflon, supra note 13, at 875.
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wife; rather, it was vested entirely in the husband. And it followed
that the husband was made legally responsible to provide for the
wife's economic needs. In return the spouses acquired some basic
protections: marriage, a reliable status; and, in the event of divorce,
the promise of continuing obligations towards each other.
Commentators have two explanations of the dynamics of property
division on divorce under the coverture system. One is that if the
husband wanted to terminate the marriage, the wife could argue
she had detrimentally relied on his duty to support her in the
future, and thus had a legally protected interest in receiving
continued support. The other is that because divorces were so
difficult to obtain, as a practical matter a wife was placed in a
strong negotiating position should the husband want to separate;
essentially, she could negotiate future support in exchange for her
agreement to the husband's departure. Although these explanations
have merit, in law the wife could not be viewed as a fully
contracting partner because her ability to contract ended upon her
marriage. The wife was controlled by a legal system that disabled
her contracting
rights and by her husband who controlled all the
33
assets.

Smith describes this model of marriage as a combination of Commitment with
Monarchy.3 4 For Smith, Commitment means that the lifelong commitment that the
two individuals have made should override their individual interests in the
relationship, 35 and Monarchy means that within the marriage there is a leader and a
follower, and the leader is given the rights and responsibilities in the relationship,
in trust, for the sake of the marriage. 36 Another way of conceptualizing a permanent
as property-is
marriage-following my proposed framework of viewing marriage
37
by viewing it as an inalienable property right at this stage in time.
2. Alimony as a "Continuing Obligation" in a No-Divorce Scheme
This conception of marriage, theoretically without divorce, developed
alongside an intellectually consistent and straightforward theory of alimony.
Alimony "originally arose as a remedy" during the years "in which absolute
divorce theoretically was unavailable."3 8 Although absolute divorce was
unavailable, if an aggrieved wife could prove that her husband "had engaged in
specified forms of misconduct[,]" she could be given "divorce from bed and
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Smith, supra note 4, at 216.
Id.
Id. at 215.
Smith, supra note 4, at 215.
See infra Part IV.C.
Regan, supra note 9, at 2311.
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board."3 9 This meant that the couple would remain technically married to each
other under the law but would no longer share a bed or live in the same house.
Although the conceptual soundness of alimony will be challenged as
problematic under other schemes, here, it at least makes sense intellectually: the
husband should pay alimony, not as a remedy per se, but rather as the simple
continuing obligation. Since the couple is still married, the alimony payments are
the legal obligations of support that a husband is supposed to give his wife during
marriage.
This is an important theoretical distinction from the way alimony would be
conceptualized in later times-alimony was not paid as punishment for a wrong
done and it was not paid as damages for a breach; indeed, in a divorce-less world,
the marriage cannot be breached. Instead, alimony was the simple continued
marital obligation of a husband to a wife who remains his wife despite physical
separation of bed and board. n
B. Mid-1800s to 1970: Fault-Based Divorce and Recasting Alimony
1. Historical Development toward Dissoluble Marriages Based on
Fault
As the Church, and also family land, became less and less the focus of
relationships, this imposition of everlasting marriage without the option of divorce
became outdated. 4' Enlightenment thinkers in their salons, and romance novelists
in their publications, began pushing married love as a credible idea, and women
began publically protesting loveless marriages.4 2 Eventually, marriages based on
romantic feelings became the ideal.43
It is ironic that today, many of the people who advocate against easy divorces
do so with the idea that they are defending the idea of romantic love, because it
was the very emergence of love-based marriages that pushed for the availability of
divorce. It was because marriage became based on romantic feelings, which are
emotional, and because "human emotions need not remain eternally constant..
[that] divorce became practically possible." 44
2. Alimony as a Punitive Remedy in a Fault-Based Divorce Scheme
Because alimony was conceptualized as a continuing obligation under an
unbroken marriage in the "separation of bed and board" context, it is by no means
obvious that it would have continued as a remedy under divorce. Because the
aggrieved spouse was actually leaving the marriage, it does not follow logically
39.
Id.
40.
Id. ("The payment of alimony in the event of a divorce 'from bed and board' thus literally fulfilled an
ongoing spousal obligation.").
41.
See Brinig & Crafton, supranote 13, at 875.
42.
See generally COONTZ, supra note 23.
43.
See Brinig & Crafton, supra note 13, at 875.
44.
Id.
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why the other spouse would need to continue paying money as a substitute for the
wife's right to support had she stayed in the marriage.45 Academics have mused,
"Would it not be more logical to say that when the marriage is dissolved all rights
and duties based upon it end?"' 46 But there were clear policy reasons why the
practice of alimony should continue, not the least of which was that divorced
women were seldom able to support themselves financially. 47 Of course, we could
imagine a legal alternate universe where these women availed themselves to other
sorts of remedies instead of pursuing alimony, but as it happened, the interspousal
immunity doctrine was developing at about this time, preventing them from
bringing tort actions.48

As a result, society was caught between wanting wives to be financially
supported and not allowing them to bring separate actions. Society turned to

alimony to solve the problem; but this required that alimony be recast as something
49

other than a "continuing obligation." The solution was to turn to the idea of fault.
Alimony was no longer conceived of as continuing obligation but as a sort of

"damages for breach of the terms of the marriage."50 The marriage itself was
characterized as "an entity or a union rather than as some sort of an arrangement
for gain between two players" and "there were clear consequences for breaching[:].
.for women, the loss of their status and support, for men, the loss of wealth
through property division or alimony."'"
In essence, during this time period preceding no-fault divorce, alimony was

punitive; a type of punishment for the spouse-at-fault to pay. At this point, it is
appropriate to discuss the difference between torts and contracts. Legal scholarship
has generally emphasized the fault aspect of alimony here, without much regard to

whether the fault is contractual or tortious.52
However, there is a distinction between the two. Although there have been
some academic currents that push to integrate contract law into torts,53 others have
emphasized that contracts should occupy its own sphere.5 4 An earthy distinction
45.

Regan, supra note 9, at 2311.

46.

HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 16.1 (2d ed. 1988).

47.
48.

See Regan, supranote 9, at 2311-12.
Brinig & Crafton, supra note 13, at 875.
The consolidated remedy of divorce and alimony became an exclusive remedy during the
nineteenth century, largely because of the development of the doctrine of interspousal
immunity. Although a spouse could sue for breach of contract or for ejectment from solely
owned property, there could be no action for torts to person or property. In part this was
because of a reluctance to become involved with the intimacies of the marital relationship,
in part because the doctrine showed a fear of disrupting marital stability that probably was
not warranted, given the severity of some of the harm alleged.

49.
Id. at 875-76 ("This, then was the 'old marriage,' an enforceable contract designed for the most part to
be permanent, which encouraged values of altruism, sharing, and investment in the marriage.").
Id.at 876.
50.
51.
Id.
52.
See, e.g., Regan, supra note 9, at 2312 (analogizing marital infidelity to breaching a contract, and then
analogizing the same thing to tortious conduct in the next sentence).
53.

See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (2d ed. 1995).

54.
See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). The title of Professor Fried's first
chapter, "The Life of Contract," is a reference to Professor Gilmore's book, cited supranote 53.
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251

between the two is that "the compensation of injury suffered through reliance" is
probably a case "of tort liability[,]" "[i]n contrast, as long as we see contractual
obligation as based on promise, on obligations that the parties have themselves
assumed, the focus of the inquiry is on the will of the parties. 5 5 In other words, tort
damages tend to revolve around the compensation of an injury, and contract
about giving the parties the
damages-prototypically, expectation damages-are
56
value of what they initially promised to do.
As a result, alimony in fault-based divorce may better be characterized as tort
damages, rather than contract damages, if courts determine these damages on
injury to the aggrieved spouse; for example, compensating them for loss of human
capital, loss of opportunity, and possible damages for abuse or harm suffered
during marriage. In general, this type of remedy was more commonly seen in the
United States, where judges determine spousal settlements by balancing competing
values in an equitable way." Courts will consider "several legislated factors, such
as the length of marriage, the causes for the dissolution of the marriage, the age and
health of the parties, and the amount and sources of income, as well as the
vocational skills, liabilities, and needs of each party." 58 This is tort law in the most
general sense: the court attempts to quantify how the dissolution of marriage hurt
the aggrieved party and under those circumstances, what compensation is just.
In contrast, alimony in fault-based divorce may be better characterized as
contract damages, rather than tort damages, if courts determine these damages
based on expectation values; for example, by awarding an injured spouse enough
money to maintain the lifestyle she would have maintained had she stayed married.
Although not precisely expectation damages, the British divorce system-by
dividing property equally between spouses instead of making equitable
considerations 9-is more in line with awarding expectation damages than an
American court would be. This is because when a wife receives half of her
husband's estate, she can generally maintain her lifestyle, regardless of how much
she contributed to the marriage. For example, public figure Heather Mills allegedly
received $64 million from ex-husband Paul McCartney in her divorce settlement.6 °
This means that Mills was being paid approximately $1800 for each hour of her
marriage, 61 which cannot reasonably be said to measure her input into the marriage,
nor any harm or diminution she suffered as a result of marriage.
55.
Id. at4.
56.
Id. at 3. Professor Fried deals with marriage explicitly, categorizing it as one of the categories of
"legally binding arrangements that are initiated by agreement" but "singled out and made subject to a set of rules
that often have little to do with that agreement."
57.
Margaret Ryznar, All's Fair in Love and War: But What About in Divorce? The Fairnessof Property
Division in American and English Big Money Divorce Cases, 86 N.D. L. REV. 115, 119 (2010) ("The principle

that governs this.., in the majority of states is equitable distribution, which seeks an equitable, but not necessarily
equal, division between the spouses.").
58.
Id. at 121.
59.
Id. at 141 (noting that English courts apply "the yardstick of equality to property division" rather than
equitability).
60.
Jennifer Conlin, Divorce: Money Changes Everything, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/09/yourmoney/mdivorce.php?page- I (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
61.
Id.
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Admittedly, the connection between American divorce law and tort damages
(reliance damages), and British divorce law and contracts damages (expectation
damages), is somewhat attenuated. Also, the American system makes use of
damages that sound like unjust enrichment or restitution, most notably in marital
support of educational degrees. 62 Because states vary in divorce settlements, the
value of educational degrees is sometimes dealt with in tort-like reliance damages
(when the aggrieved spouse is awarded, for example, the amount she contributed in
tuition) or with restitution (when the aggrieved spouse is awarded, for example,
with projected future income due to the degree). The underlying premise is that in a
fault-based divorce, the aggrieved spouse is being compensated due to the fault of
the other spouse. This lends itself to clear analogies to both contracts and torts
63
where an aggrieved plaintiff seeks damages for the alleged fault of the defendant.
But this system-stabilized by the idea of fault-would not survive the Progressive
Era.64
C. Post-1970 Marriages: The Rise of No-Fault Divorces
1. Historical Development toward No-Fault Dissoluble Marriages
In the 1940s, World War II caused large numbers of women to enter the
marketplace, working at jobs previously held by men.65 The social atmosphere
changed:
Soon a pattern emerged of numbers of unhappy spouses going to
states where divorces were easier or less costly to obtain and
procuring "quickie" ends to their marriages. Another means to
evade a relatively strict divorce law was the practice of collusive or
fraudulent divorce, where the complaining spouse would perjure

62.

Regan, supra note 9, at 2326-27.
New York has been most explicit in adopting a policy of compensation for expected gain at
divorce. In a series of cases, New York courts have held that various forms of earnings
enhancement are marital property subject to division at divorce. Only one other state court
has followed New York in expressly holding that an educational degree or the like is marital
property, the value of which should be measured by the expected earnings attributable to it.

See also infra Part 1V.C.

63.
Further support for the parallel between fault-based litigation and divorce was the existence of tort of
criminal conversation. The plaintiff could seek damages against a third party for committing adultery with the
plaintiff's spouse. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 271 ("The tort of criminal conversation is the family-law analog of
intentional inducement of breach of contract."). Criminal conversation is no longer a tort in practice today because
of the societal move away from a fault-based system of marriage and divorce laws, which is described in the
upcoming section.
64.
See Brinig & Craflon, supra note 13, at 877.
65.

See, e.g., R.J.Q. ADAMS, ARMS AND THE WIZARD. LLOYD GEORGE AND THE MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS

1915-1916 ch. 8 (1978) (titled "The Women's Part").
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himself or herself or actually manufacture incidents (most often, of
66
adultery) with the collaboration of the other partner.
This shift in attitude-reflecting a growing craftiness among unhappy spouses
and a growing disregard for the religious sanctity of marriage, which characterized
the centuries before-was also captured by books and movies of the time.67 In
68
1969, California became the first state to embrace a regime of no-fault divorce.
Before then, adultery was the only ground for divorce. 69 California's no-fault
divorce "not only eliminated the necessity for a showing of fault but also the need
for both spouses agreeing to the divorce."7 ° By 1985, every state had adopted nofault divorce laws. 7' Following this change, America has experienced a large
decline in the number of adults who choose to marry, a large increase in the
number of children born out of wedlock, and a striking 7correlation-that
did not
2
exist in 1960--between marriage and education or wealth.
Practical effects aside, no-fault divorce also metamorphosed the intellectual
motivations justifying the institution of alimony. "Since fault (breach), which had
previously been the trigger for alimony (damages), was no longer necessary (or
available, in some cases) for divorce," alimony shifted from damages to merely a
way of "providing for the needy spouse who could not support himself or
herself." 73 It would be a "temporary measure" until the dependent spouse was no74
longer in need and the payments "should not bind the other spouse financially.,
These distributions had to be made "without regard to fault., 75
2. Alimony as a "Continuing Obligation" in a No-Fault Scheme
The shift to no-fault divorces also changed the way marriage would be
modeled. Marriage "increasingly came to be modeled along the lines of a business
partnership" between the spouses.7 6 Catherine Smith has noted several important
parallels that can be drawn between marriage under the modern scheme and
business partnerships. First, when the partners dissolve the marriage or business,
66.
67.
enlists the
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Brinig & Crafton, supranote 13, at 876-77.
See, e.g., DOUBLE INDEMNITY (Paramount Pictures 1994) (depicting the story of an unhappy wife who
aid of an insurance investigator to kill her husband in order to collect life insurance).
See, e.g., Brinig & Crafton, supra note 13, at 877.
See id.
Id.
See Regan, supra note 9, at 2313.
Belinda Luscombe, Marriage: What's It Good For? TIME, Nov. 29, 2010, at 48-49.
In 1960 ... nearly 70% of American adults were married; now only about half are. Eight
times as many children are born out of wedlock. Back then, two-thirds of 20-somethings
were married; in 2008 just 26% were. And college graduates are now far more likely to
marry (64%) than those with no higher education (48%). When an institution so central to
human experience suddenly changes shape in the space of a generation or two, it's worth
trying to figure out why.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Brinig & Crafton, supra note 13, at 877.
Id. at 877-78.
Id. at 878.
Smith, supra note 4, at 217.
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they focus on recovering their share of the venture, not on expectation damages
(unlike in contracts). 77 Second, the contributions of one spouse or partner do not
"overshadow" those of the other, even if it has resulted in more income. 78 Both
partners are respected for providing their share of the work. Under the partnership
mode of thinking, the court typically seeks to divide up conventional forms of
property, which do not include human capital. 79 Lastly, the decision to dissolve the
partnership is not viewed based on fault but based on changes in circumstances,
feelings, or other opportunities that have arisen. 80 Under this scheme, post-divorce
payouts are justified only to the extent that they reflect some extension of the
natural allocation of assets to business partners who have both invested in the
partnership. They are not punitive, nor are they triggered by fault.
An alternative model is the contract model of marriage (which Henry E. Smith
refers to as the "contractarian model"). 8' This approach "differs from the
partnership model by seeking an implicit contract in the marriage rather than
looking to off-the-rack rules already set up by the law. 82 In seeking the implicit
contract, the relevant question is what the spouses intended to contract for in the
first place, in the same way that a court would evaluate the expectations of each
party in a common law contract dispute. Under this scheme, post-divorce payouts
may be compared to expectation damages but not perfectly so because it is unclear
who the breaching party is: the spouse initiating the divorce? the spouse who
committed adultery? the spouse who just, "it's not you, it's me," fell out of love?
In any event, it is clear that under both the partnership model and the contract
model, the alimony damages are conceptualized in accordance with the view that
dissolving the marriage-by itself-is not a punishable act. As a result, like
property allocation after the dissolution of a partnership or after the breach of a
contract, alimony was no longer viewed as punitive.

77.
78.

Id.
Id.

79.
80.
81.

Henry E. Smith, IntermediateFiling in Household Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 145, 167 (1998).
Smith, supranote 4, at 217.
H.E. Smith, supra note 79, at 168.

82.

Id.
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D. Summary
Time
Period

AntiquityRenaissance
RenaissanceMid-1800s

Mid-1800s1970

1970sCurrent

Primary Availability
Social
of Divorce
Forces
Behind
Marriage
Politics
Available
and
and Widely
Money
Used
Religion
Divorce not
and Land
available,
but
separation
possible
Rise of
Fault-based
romantic
divorce
love
available

Romantic
love

No-Fault
divorce
available

__

Nature of
Alimony/Property
Payments Upon
Divorce/Separation

Alimony available
upon separation as
"continuing
obligation" of the
marriage
Alimony
conceptualized as
morally punitive (for
the fault) under either
tort (equitable
distribution) or
contracts (equal
distribution)
Alimony
conceptualized as
contract damages or
property allocation at
the dissolution of a
partnership

Model of
Marriage

Model of
Marriage
(My
Proposal) 83

Not legally
recognized (de
facto status)
Commitment,
Monarchy,
Status
(permanent)

Commons
(nonprivatized)
PropertyInalienable

Contract (but
not for
instrumental
gain), Union,
Duty

Propertypartially
alienable

Contract,
Partnership

Propertyfully
alienable

Table 1. This table summarizes Part II, Sections A through C, supra.
It will become apparent that Row Four of Table 1 ("1970s-") is the most
conceptually problematic part of this table,8 4 and that the contract and partnership
theories do not adequately capture what marriage means to us now. With the
advent of no-fault divorces, alimony can no longer be soundly categorized as
punitive, so academics have turned to economic theories of human capital loss and
opportunity costs. However, these prove problematic at times, and a theory of
property rights may more ingenuously reflect the meaning and motivation of
spousal support today.

83.
84.

Column six represents the model this article advances.
See infra Part IV.A.
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III. WHAT IS A PROPERTY RIGHT?

A. What is Property?
In law, "property" is a term of art. One way to define property is as "nothing
but a basis of expectation, the expectation of deriving certain advantages from a
thing which we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation in which we
stand towards it." 85 But even the word "possession" is ambiguous. It is used to
reference both the physical act of power or control over something, as well as the
legal conclusion of lawful entitlement.8 6 Harold Demsetz has prominently offered
one way to understand property, that its "main allocative function" is "the
internalization of beneficial and harmful effects. ' 87 Thus, property rights "develop
to internalize externalities8 8 when the gains of internalization become larger than
the costs of internalization. ' 89 As technologies change, property rights regimes will
also develop in the direction of efficiency, usually towards a scheme of private
rights. 90 Private property schemes tend to outperform common property schemes
because of a "partial concentration of benefits and cost" and because the "cost of
negotiating over the remaining externalities will be reduced greatly." 9 Indeed, it
has been observed that it "is for good reason that the law has created institutions
whereby only those who sow may reap." 92 Marriage can also be viewed as
privatization. When couples formally contract to stay in a relationship long-term, it
provides a basis for internalizing the fruits of the marriage (both economic and
emotional) within the two parties. This may be contrasted with cultures where there
85.
JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111 -12 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931) (explaining that property
"is not material, it is metaphysical ... a mere conception of the mind.").
On this distinction, consider John Kass, Snowstorm's Charm Can't Stand Up to Law of Street,
86.
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1999. Several commentators, including Richard Epstein, have considered the property right
implications in view of a winter-time norm that has developed in Chicago. Following heavy snowfall, shoveler's
mark their clear street-parking spaces with broken basement chairs or other "heavy ugly object[s]." Id. Although
this right to claim a shoveled parking spot with a chair is not legally recognized, it creates a sense of entitlement.
See generally Richard A. Epstein, Allocation of the Commons. Parking and Stopping on the Commons (John M.
Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 134 2d Series and Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 15),
availableat http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-282512 (last visited Mar., 9, 2012).
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 135, 13687.
37 (Robert C. Ellickson, Carol M. Rose & Bruce A. Ackerman eds., 3d ed. 2002) ("A primary function of property
rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities. Every cost and benefit
associated with social interdependencies is a potential externality.").
88.
Demsetz defines "externality" to include:
[E]xternal costs, external benefits, and pecuniary as well as nonpecuniary externalities ....
What converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an externality is that the cost of bringing
the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of the interacting persons is too high to
make it worthwhile.
Id. at 136. "Internalizing" means a process that enables "these effects to bear (in greater degree) on all interacting
persons." Id.
89.
Id.at 137.
Id.
90.
91.
Id. at 143.
Epstein, supra note 86, at 2. Epstein goes on to critique some of Demsetz's theories, pointing out that
92.
even if privatization may solve old problems of negotiating over remaining externalities, it may bring new
problems.
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is no ideal of commitment between two people that would give them assurance
that, at least theoretically, their investments into the relationship should be kept
within the marriage.
Some commentators conceive property ownership as comprised of an assorted
"bundle of rights" that the owner may exercise, including the right to possess, the
93
right to transfer, the right to use, the right to exclude, and the right to destroy.
These bundles can be limited as well.94 In practice, courts tend to focus on three
core rights: the right to exclusive possession, 95 the right to exclusively use, and the
right to dispose or transfer. This bundle of rights "picture was the overwhelmingly
96
consensus view among commentators of the mid-to-late twentieth century.,
A competing-although not entirely inconsistent 9 7-view is understanding
property as a "kind of mini-sovereignty., 98 Property has been famously described
by William Blackstone as the "sole and despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of
any other individual in the universe." 99 This description of property-as an in rem
right to Blackstonian sovereignty rather than as a long checklist of separated
rights-has recently grown in popularity, partially because of a renewed focus on
93.

See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property, in MODERN UNDERSTANDINGS OF LIBERTY AND

PROPERTY 291, 291 (Richard A. Epstein ed,, 2000).
94.
For example, inalienable rights are rights that can neither be gifted nor sold. Partial market inalienable
rights are rights that cannot be sold but can be gifted (for example, body tissue).
95.
See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997) (The defendant was delivering
a mobile home, and the easiest path was cutting across the plaintiffs land. Even though the plaintiff denied his
request to cut across his land, the defendant still did it. The court decided that punitive damages were valid,
recognizing that the right to exclude is one of the most important rights that landowners have-validating personal
autonomy and faith in the government-and that when the right to exclude is not protected, destructive self-help
remedies might ensue); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (The defendants enter upon the plaintiff's land to
provide legal and health services to migrant farm workers. The court finds that the right to exclude is subordinate
to the public policy interests of human rights-the rights of the occupants to obtain legal and medical counsel.
Property rights are limited by human values.).
96.
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, J.L. & ECON.,
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1758846 (last visited Mar. 9,
2012). Merrill and Smith note that, "The bundle of rights picture was the overwhelming consensus view among
commentators of the mid- to late twentieth century." See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CONSTITUTION 26-29 (1997) (reporting that the bundle-of-rights conception of property is so pervasive that
"even the dimmest law student can be counted upon to parrot the ritual phrases on command"); see also Fineman,
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
97.
Id. at 11-12.
The bundle of rights picture is not logically incompatible with the understanding that
property rights are in rem. But it has a strong tendency to obscure the in rem feature of
property. If property rights can be adjusted along countless margins, often in the course of
the rendering of specific judgments by courts, then it becomes natural to start to think of
property as a kind of master list of rights and duties set forth by some authoritative state
intuition for each type of property-or indeed for each particular parcel of property. Under
the bundle picture, property becomes an elaborate catalogue of in personam rights, setting
forth what the owner can or cannot do, and concomitantly what others can and cannot do,
with respect to specific resources, established by the state either through legislation or
litigation. The right-duty relationship no longer runs between the owner and 'the world,' but
the owner and the state.
98.
Id. at 8.
99.
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 45,
46 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002).
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the importance of exclusion rights.' 00 By his right to exclude the world, the owner
"assumes the role of gatekeeper or manager" and will have "a powerful incentive
to invest in and develop the asset, because the owner will capture the benefit of
these actions as the residual claimant."' 0 1 The bundle of rights, in contrast, has "the
exclusion right fade into the background as part of the general bundle of sticks, no
more important than the right to inherit or the right to use the asset for particular
purposes.' 0 2
There are several trends emerging from the understanding of property rights
that are applicable in the marriage context. First, property rights are based on
expectations, both about what we expect to derive from the relationship and also
from what we intend to contribute. There is some expectation of the right to
exclude the rest of the world from the relationship. Second, property rights are
personal. They capture more elements of our personhood and self-identities than
contracts generally do, even though contracts are also expectation-based. This is
partially why injunctions (judgments against property rights) are much more
invasive than damages (judgments against liability rights).103 Furthermore, property
rights can be characterized either by an essential characteristic (sole and despotic
dominion) or by a collection of rights ("bundle of sticks"). Marriage is similar. It
can be viewed as either a deep, floating, overlaying connection between two
people, or as a collection of the list of legal rights that come with marriage.
Commentators have described it in both ways. Lastly, property rights can be used
as tools to facilitate the optimum amounts of investment and thus facilitate an
efficient system. All four of these aspects of property rights offer insight into the
way we think about how marriages are made and dissolved after the divorce regime
changes in the 1970s.
B. Property Rules and Liability Rules
The most commonly used types of protections for entitlements are property
rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules. 1°4 Although other entitlements are
occasionally used and others theoretically available'° 5-and furthermore, the

100.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 96, at 24. ("Nevertheless, we will argue that Coase's picture of property
[the bundle of rights picture] had a distorting influence, and in certain respects may have retarded intellectual
progress in developing our understanding of the institution of property."). The authors go on to claim that "the
bundle of rights picture fails to capture the centrality of exclusion rights to the institution of property," "the bundle
of rights picture fails to highlight the enormous information cost constraints associated with any system of in rem
rights," and "the in rem nature of property rights renders implausible" the claim that "the problem of social cost is
reciprocal in nature, and thus it is not useful to speak of one party to an externality as being 'the cause' of any
problem of incompatible demands on resource." Id. at 24-25, 27-28.
101.
ld. at24.
102.
Id. at 25.
103.
See infra Part I1I.B.
104.
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One
View of the Cathedral,in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 233, 234 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed.
2002).

105.
See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedralin
Another Light, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 249, 258 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002); Saul
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categories are not absolutely distinct'°6-the three types of entitlements can help us
consider why we want to protect different entitlements.
An entitlement is protected by a property rule "to the extent that someone who
wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a
voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the
seller."' 0 7 Because the transaction must be voluntary, property rules afford
entitlements owners the most amount of autonomy-he can choose whether or not
to sell the entitlement, as well as the price to sell if he chooses the former. Property
rules are valuable because they incentivize investment and foster feelings of
security.
An entitlement is protected by the liability rule: "someone may destroy the
10 8
initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it.'
Contracts, for example, are generally thought to be protected by liability rules
insofar as expectation damages are awarded.' 0 9
An inalienability rule is one that prevents any transfer of the entitlement, even
when both the potential seller and potential buyer are willing.' 10 Inalienability rules
thus "not only 'protect' the entitlement; they may also be viewed as limiting or
regulating the grant of the entitlement itself.""'
There are several insights that these settings may provide. First of all, it is clear
that insofar as marriage can be thought of as property, before the mid-1800s, it was
an inalienable right. Even if both husband and wife mutually and completely
agreed that they wanted to divorce each other, it was prohibited by the state.' 12 As a
result, after one marries, that marriage becomes inalienable to him or her. The
inalienability rule for protecting marriage has completely fallen out of favor
because of an understanding of the value of autonomy, the understanding that
romantic feelings change, and the understanding that pre-marriage couples may not
completely understand the implications of their vows and should not be held to
them. "3
2149 (1997). In
Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J.
addition, entitlements may also be protected by claims of restitution or unjust enrichment.
106.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 104, at 234.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
Contractual entitlements under the general scheme of expectation damages are protected by liability
rules, because the breaching party may deprive you of your entitlement (your right to their promised performance)
as long as they pay you an amount of money determined by the court. Theoretically, we can contrast this with a
hypothetical regime where Contract Law is always enforced by specific performance-this would be a property
right rather than a liability right because the only way to avoid performance would be to secure the permission of
the counter-party.
110.
Ill.
112.

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 104, at 234.
Id. at 235.
See Brinig & Crafton, supra note 13; Fineman, supra note 28.

113.
Although commentators no longer advance the inalienability rule as a viable solution, some have
recently proposed milder versions. See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 11,at 1259-60.
Experience teaches us, in any case, that unlike the parties to many commercial contracts, [a
man and woman] lack the ability to predict the optimal duration of a relationship that
depends upon extended investments and emotional maturation. Whether and when the
parties have children, the value of the emotional bonds that are generated by the marriage,
and the value of alternative relationships are only a few of the numerous factors that will
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Modem marriage rights seem to be protected by liability rules. In America,
courts handle post-divorce payouts through more equitable means, considering a
variety of factors including both spouses' future needs, contribution to the
marriage, human capital, and emotional investment.' 14 In England, courts handle
post-divorce payouts through more rule-like equal-distribution measures." 5 Both of
these protect the entitlement of marriage with a liability rule, with respect to the
other spouse. In other words, if a husband wants to divorce his wife, he may, but he
has to pay a price that is determined by the court system. However, the amount of
this price will depend on the way the court approaches the institution of marriage
and its role in relation to the institution.
This article does not argue that marriage modeled on property should be
protected by a property rule. It has long been recognized that there are too many
costs to forcing spouses to stay in marriages they do not want to be in, so
inalienability rules are no longer taken to be a viable option. A property rule has
also been universally regarded as problematic. To require that an individual acquire
the permission of his or her spouse to divorce would result in hold-out situations,
potential strong-arming, and would generally undermine the ideals of love and
community that marriage is supposed to protect." 6
Protecting marriage with a liability rule is consistent with this article's thesis
that marriage should be conceptualized as a property right. Many things we
consider property are subject to liability rules. For example, a person's home is
subject to a liability rule with respect to the State's prerogative to eminent domain.
The State may elect to condemn a house in return for "just compensation." ' 1 7 That
does not prevent the house from being considered property of its owner. Another
affect the durability of the relationship. Under these circumstances, although [a man and
woman] may aspire to a lifelong relationship, they are properly precluded from making a
lifetime contract (or any other "excessive" commitment term) that does not preserve the
possibility of escaping the commitment in the future should the returns from the relationship
fall below the nonmarital alternatives.
114.
See Ryznar, supra note 57, at 141 (noting that "the American system ...remains split between the
community property and equitable distribution approaches. In the average American divorce case, there may not
be much practical difference between community property and equitable distribution.").
115.
Id.
In the average English divorce case, applying the yardstick of equality to property division
would have a result similar to that under a reasonable needs approach because of the
modesty of the divisible assets-half of these would not exceed the spouse's reasonable
needs. In big money cases, however, there is necessarily a significant difference between the
lower income spouse's reasonable needs and half of all divisible property-raising the
important question of which approach produces a fairer result.
116.
See Cohen, supra note 2, at 300. Cohen makes it clear that even in situations where spouses are taking
advantage of each other's investments, forcing them to stay together and honor the marriage would be
problematic.
First, many of the acts that a spouse has implicitly contracted to perform cannot be specified
nor their performance monitored. What is more significant, however, is that the marital
duties are to be performed in a certain spirit, and no court can succeed in forcing an
unwilling spouse to perform marital duties in a spirit of love and devotion.
117.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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example is trespass cases of minor encroachments. Under some jurisdictions, when
a plaintiff sues over a minor encroachment onto his property that was not made in
bad faith, he is protected by a liability rule-the defendant does not have to remove
the encroachment but must pay market value for the intrusion. 8
A spouse's right to his marriage is protected by a liability rule. Given the
liability rule, the court must still determine the amount of damages. This is when
the nature of the entitlement becomes relevant. If the entitlement is a contract-type
creature protected by a liability rule, the court will focus on what the parties
expected from the beginning of the union before it dissolved." 9 If the entitlement is
a partnership protected by a liability rule, the court will focus on sharing the assets
of the partnership with less regard to initial expectations. However, if the
entitlement is property protected by a liability rule, there is a much stronger case
that the court will be more sensitive to the subjective values of each party.
For example, consider eminent domain, where a liability rule protects an
owner's home. When the government takes the home, there are widespread
concerns over the ability of a fair-market price to compensate condemnees for their
sentimental attachment to the property. Those profound emotions, memories, and
human sentiments will be diminished by the liability rule. 20 Commentators have
been encouraged to take these things into account when calculating a good "just
compensation" value for eminent domain.
Similarly, we want courts in divorce cases to treat the parties with sensitivity to
their marriage, especially the aggrieved spouse. This is the principle difference
between applying a liability rule to a liability right versus applying a liability rule
to a property right. When a liability rule protects a liability right (for example, a
contract), courts tend to be very systematized and automatic. However, when a
liability rule protects a property right (such as in eminent domain and here, in
divorce cases), we want courts to consider a more human aspect of the property
right and this article's model captures this.
IV. WHY IS MARRIAGE BETTER CONCEPTUALIZED AS A PROPERTY RIGHT?
A. Inalienability and the Evolution of Divorce Regimes
Until the mid-1800s, divorces were typically unavailable, so marriages were
permanent.' 2' Catherine Smith has described this conception of marriage as
"Commitment" mixed with "Monarchy."'122 However, this article proposes using
118.
It is true that the classic case Pile v. Pedrick, 167 Pa. 296 (1895), cuts against the principle that minor
encroachments should be protected by liability rules rather than property rules. However, the court's ruling in this
case has also been repeatedly suggested by property professors to be inefficient and incorrect.
119.
In other words, expectation damages.
120.
121.

See, e.g.,
Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957 (2004).
See supra PartlI.A.1.

122.
Smith, supra note 4, at 216. Smith defines Marriage as Commitment as "Marriage is a relationship
involving two individuals who have made a lifelong commitment-to each other and to the relationship-that
overrides their individual interests in the relationship." Id at 215. She defines Marriage as Monarchy as "In
marriage one must lead and the other must follow, and the leader is accorded the relationship's rights and
responsibilities in trust to assure the success of the marriage." Id.
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the conception of an unalienable property right. This framework affords two
advantages: first, it captures the comparative moral dynamics of inalienability
rights with a committed marriage; second, it makes sense of the transition from a
no-divorce regime to our regime today. Under this framework, we do not have to
hop around different conceptions of marriage to explain divorce regimes under
different time periods: for example, claiming that marriage progressed from a
Commitment, to a Democracy, to a Partnership; instead, we can view the
development of marriage as a consistent transition of a property right from fully
inalienable to fully alienable.
The idea of inalienability is not unfamiliar terrain-it has always "had a central
place in our legal and moral culture."' 123 Because inalienability can mean a variety
of things, I refer to inalienability as a property right that cannot be lost at all. 24 In
the period before the mid- 1800s, the status of being married-if this is considered a
property right-was an inalienable one. 125 Inalienability "often expresses an
aspiration for non-commodification[,]" because "a world in which human
interactions are conceived of as market trades is different from one in which they
are not.' 126 As such, moves toward alienability are often viewed with suspicion
127
because "commodification brings about an inferior form of human life."'
Similarly, during the period that marriage was inalienable, the rhetoric was
grounds that
similar-the inalienability of the property right was rooted in
28 moral
marriage should not be tradable or disposable, like an object. 1

123.
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 336 (Robert C.
Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability].
124.
Id. ("Sometimes inalienable means nontransferable, sometimes only nonsalable. Sometimes inalienable
means nonrelinquishable by a rightholder; sometimes it refers to rights that cannot be lost at all.").
Regan, supranote 9, at 2311.
125.
[describing] the period in which absolute divorce theoretically was unavailable, and divorce
from bed and board was the only form of relief available to an aggrieved spouse. If a
petitioning spouse could prove that her husband had engaged in specified forms of
misconduct, a divorce from bed and board would permit the parties to live separately,
although they remained formally married. In such circumstances, a husband continued to be
held to his spousal obligation of providing for the financial needs of his wife.
126.
127.

Radin, Market-Inalienability,supranote 123, at 337-38.
Id.at 339.
For critics of the market society, commodification simultaneously expresses and creates
alienation. The word 'alienation' thus harbors an ironic double meaning. Freedom of
alienation is the paramount characteristic of liberal property rights, yet Marx saw a
necessary connection between this market alienability and human alienation. . . .In his
treatment of estranged labor, Marx portrayed workers' alienation from their own human
self-activity as the result of producing objects that became market commodities. By
objectifying the labor of the worker, commodities create object-bondage and alienate
workers from the natural world in and with which they should constitute themselves by
creative interaction.

See COONTZ, supra note 23. The no-divorce regime was ushered in by the Church under moralistic
128.
rhetoric. Contrast this with the story of Marcus Porcius Cato, for example, who saw marriage as more of a
commodity that could be traded-he divorced his wife and arranged for her to marry one of his friends, "in order
to strengthen the friendship and family connections between the two men," then promptly remarried her after his
friend died.
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Today's no-fault regime can be viewed as the intuitive opposite of an
inalienability scheme-instead of being bound indefinitely to marriage, spouses
can alienate their marriage at will. Even though few argue that we should return to
inalienability where divorce is altogether banned, many feel intuitively that nofault divorces-total
alienability-do not sit correctly with a moral view of the
129
marriage.
of
value
B. Problems with Other Models of Marriage
1. The Contract Conception
Although the marriage is technically a contract under state law, there are so
many striking differences between marriage and other contracts that marriage
begins to look like an entirely different creature. Legal academics have repeatedly
acknowledged marriage as a "special case."' 130 They have called it "a peculiar
contract."'13
First, some have noted that one difference between marriage and other
contracts is that marriage "cannot be dissolved solely by the parties but only with
the concurrence of a court."' 132 In practice today, the court's concurrence is very
easy to obtain. 33 However, the fact that couples must go to court to work out their
family matters, even if both desire the divorce, is a special restraint on autonomy
not usually found in the world of contracts.
Second, there is a colloquial understanding that contract rights are usually
assignable. 134 However, in marriage, "none135of the personal rights or obligations of
a marriage may be assigned or delegated.'
129.

See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 317-35.
Family law practitioners report anecdotally that their divorce clients are incredulous when
they learn that the divorce system lacks an official mechanism for assigning blame . . . In
these experiments, we see that many people's instinct is to punish, or at least disfavor,
wrongdoers. Subjects expressed distress that, under the no-fault law, parties can breach a
contract without repercussions. A typical comment was: "Doesn't seem fair for the party
who hasn't done anything wrong and hasn't broken her part of the contract to be treated
equally as the one who has."

130.

See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 54, at 3.
Not all promises are legally enforced, and of those which are, different categories receive
differing degrees of legal recognition.... And some arrangements that are not promissory at
all .. .are assimilated to the contractual regime. Finally, even among legally binding
arrangements that are initiated by agreement, certain ones are singled out and made subject
to a set of rules that often have little to do with that agreement. Marriage is the most obvious
example.

131.
Cohen, supra note 2, at 271. Although Professor Cohen points out differences between marriage and
other contracts, he concludes that "Nonetheless, from the legal and, more important, the economic perspective, it is
a species of contract." Id.at 272.
132.
Id.
133.
See, e.g., Luscombe, supra note 72, at 54.
134.
Legal academics have written at length about the assignability of contract rights, including objections
to the usage of the phrase. See generally Bob Allcock, Restrictions on the Assignment of Contractual Rights, 42
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 328 (1983). For people seeking legal information, however, there are numerous popularly
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Third, the rights and obligations of the parties in marriage "are defined by law
and cannot be waived by mutual consent."' 36 A profound implication of this factor
is that, as Charles Fried noted at the beginning of his book on contracts, the legal
obligations in a marriage contract are not even defined by the participating

parties-the particular vows that individuals choose to recite at their wedding have
little bearing on the legal responsibilities they are acquiring. 37 "While the parties
undertake what seems to be a substantial commitment to one another, usually they
make no agreement specifying the duties and rights of each party."' 38 This "failure
the terms of the agreement may make
of the parties to specify and articulate
139
marriage seem less like a contract."'
Because the spouses do not articulate (and in some cases, are not even
particularly aware of)140 the exact obligations of marriage, it is difficult to justify
marriage under a promise-based approach to contracts. What exactly are they
promising? Are they promising to keep the legal obligations of marriage (which
both parties might be ignorant of at the time of marriage), the vows that they recite
(which are not legally enforceable), or their true underlying intentions (which
might not match up exactly with either the law or their spoken vows)? There is also
a noticeable lack of legal default rules to serve as gap-fillers for vague marriage
vows. Consistent with this point, Robert and Elizabeth Scott have pointed out:
Much of the contractual analysis of marriage thus implicitly posits
a contractual relationship in which the parties are presumed
capable ex ante of allocating and assessing responsibility for
failures to fulfill the terms of the marital agreement. In such a
world, contract terms are clearly specified, legal enforcement is

accessible non-technical sources that claim all contractual rights are assignable. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Assignment
(Law), available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assignment_(law) (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) ("The common law
favors the freedom of assignment, so an assignment will generally be permitted unless there is an
express prohibition against assignment in the contract. Where assignment is thus permitted, the
assignor need not consult the other party to the contract."); Lawyers.com, Assigning a Contract,
http://contracts.lawyers.com/contracts/Assigning-A-Contract.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2012) ("Before attempting
to assign a contract, you will want to make sure it's legal. If the contract says nothing about assignment, it's legal
to assign it. Contract rights are property under state law and can be assigned, or bought and sold, just like any
other property.").
135.
Cohen, supra note 2, at 272.
136.
Id.
137.

See FRIED, supra note 54, at 3.

138.
Cohen, supra note 2, at 272.
139.
Id.
140.
For example, bankruptcy courts have interpreted federal law to mean that if an individual spouse files
for bankruptcy, he or she is required to include the income of his or her non-debtor spouse in the calculation for
disposable income. Even if awife and husband plan to keep separate bank accounts and their finances apart, there
are many legal responsibilities that they have for each other that neither spouse expects or intends at the time of
the wedding. See In re Carter, 205 B.R. 733, 735 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996); In re Welch, 347 B.R. 247, 252 (Bankr.
2000); In re Bottorff, 232 B.R. 171, 173
W.D. Mich. 2006); In re McNichols, 249 B.R. 160, 169 (Bankr. N.D. 111.
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1999).

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol17/iss2/4

22

: Locking in Wedlock

Spring 2012

Locking in Wedlock

ubiquitous and straightforward, and expected performance is clear.
Marriage does not fit this model well. 141
Because there is no "meeting of minds," marriage starts to look less like an
ongoing contract and more like the acquisition of property. There is a strong caveat
emptor side to marriage-you are marrying someone who has no clear obligation
to disclose issues of relevance to the marriage.
This is also problematic to an autonomy-based approach to contracts. If the
autonomy to tailor deals and alter default rules is paramount to the idea of
contracting, the failure of the parties to specify and articulate the terms of the
agreement in marriage would make it a troublesome contract. Furthermore, not
only are the rights and obligations prescribed for spouses, but also the manner in
which they should be carried out.142 Ifwe accept the proposition that contract law
should be a practice of autonomy, that it should allow individuals to fashion
relationships with other individuals on their own terms, then marriage clearly
deviates from this ideology.
Marriage also poses problems for a consideration-based approach to contracts.
Consideration is "defined as something either given or promised in exchange for a
promise." 143 What exactly is the consideration in marriage? It is clear that both
spouses are giving each other something of worth, along with a set of prescribed
obligations to each other. However, the kinds of duties associated with marriage,
such as sexual relations, affection, and love, 44 are not widely recognized as valid
consideration outside of the marriage contract. 145 It is cyclical, then, to claim that in

141.
Scott & Scott, supra note 11,at 1248. Robert and Elizabeth Scott reject the traditional contractual
conception of marriage and proceed to a "relational contract" theory to explain patterns of legal enforcement and
non-enforcement in marriage.
Relational contract theory largely resolves [the] puzzle. The marriage vows express the
couple's emotional commitment and use hortatory language to emphasize the seriousness of
the undertaking. They describe a standard of performance in idealized and general terms,
and remind the parties of their goal of maintaining a caring, cooperative relationship. But
emotional commitments are difficult to translate into quantifiable standards of performance,
and assessing responsibility for breach proves to be vexingly difficult. Thus, the law relies
on social and relational norms to promote cooperation and to enforce intramarital promises.
Indeed, relational theory suggests that formal legal enforcement of all the terms of a
"marital bargain" is inadvisable, because legal intervention risks undermining the parties'
cooperative equilibrium, and ultimately subverts their efforts to sustain a lasting
relationship.
Id. at 1230. The relational contract theory offers a lot of insight into the aspects of marriage that the law chooses to
enforce. It differs from this article because it departs from a traditional view of contracts by crafting a new
category; here, this article is removing marriage from consideration as a special type of contract, but rather
attributing it to the very familiar category of property that we are familiar working with.
142.
See Cohen, supra note 2, at 300 (assuming that "marital duties are to be performed in a certain
spirit... of love and devotion").
143.
FRIED, supra note 54, at 28.
144.
See Cohen, supra note 2, at 300.
145.
See, e.g.,
MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 5:18 (2010) ("It is well established that love and affection do
not provide consideration. To support a promise, there has to be something more objective or tangible than the
natural affections of family relationships.").
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marriage, love can be consideration, whereas love is the consideration that makes
marriage a contract.
Lastly, marriage poses a problem for the remedial aspect of contracts. Because
divorce is no-fault, marriage is now an illusory contract that does not bind either
side to their promises. This has been criticized by law and economics
commentators as facilitating opportunistic behavior by husbands that undermine
the marital investments made by their wives. 14 6 On one hand, the concept of
efficient breach is nonsensical in marriage, because it would be impossible to
approximate the value of the marriage to one spouse versus the value of the
marriage to an intervening individual who is trying to induce the breach. Indeed,
the canonical economic concepts of utility should not be aggregated in marriageif a wife wishes to leave her husband with ten units of desire and her husband
wishes her to stay with twelve units of desire, most people would still say the
relationship should end. It takes two (willing partners) to tango. On the other hand,
the most prominent push against efficient breach comes from commentators who
emphasize the moral significance of a promise. 147 Yet, we should not bind people
to their marital vows just because the vows were promises. Doing so would bring
us back to a pre-1800 world of no divorce.
In the end, "both communitarian and law and economics critics argue that the
no-fault regime has caused a decline in the importance of marriage and a loss of
its valuable social functions.,, 148 The fact that this aspect of marriage has caught
the attention and criticism of many commentators should raise the question:
if marriage is rightly conceptualized as a contract, why is modem marriage's
most prominent attributes decidedly non-contractual? If marriage is rightly
conceptualized as a contract, why does it diverge from the way contracts are
traditionally and essentially enforced? Although marriage is technically a legal
contract requiring paperwork and signatures, it cannot be justified as a contract in
the classical, academic sense.
2.

The Partnership Conception

Conceptualizing marriage as a partnership involves viewing it as a venture
designed to promote the interests of its participants. According to some, property
should be allocated, upon dissolution, not according to individual contributions,
but according to the overall assets in equal distribution. 49 However, other
commentators have noted that under "strict application of partnership theory, the
law would rely on market principles to calculate the relative value of the spouses'
contributions, as well as the balance of payments resulting from implicit economic
146.
See generally Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics ofAlimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1978); Cohen, supra
note 2; Brinig & Crafton, supra note 13.
147.

See generally FRIED, supra note 54.

148.
Scott & Scott, supra note 11, at 1229.
149.
Commentators have equated a partnership model of marriage with equal distribution of assets upon
divorce. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 4, at 218; see also Regan, supra note 9, at 2317 (noting in a discussion on
partnership theory in marriage that there "is a tendency, however, at least to begin with the presumption that
spouses are entitled to an equal share of marital assets at divorce").
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exchanges
between them, to determine each spouse's entitlement to a share of
1' 50
assets."
With regard to the first measure-equal distribution-it has been argued that
"the legal equality of men and women does not translate into equality in terms of
their roles, earning capacity, and post-divorce needs.' 5' These are among the
reasons that partnership theory has been rejected as a tenable solution to modern
marriage.152 Furthermore, equal distribution
is not frequently employed in the
53
United States as an empirical matter. 1
The second measure-using market tools to calculate contributions to
determine entitlements-is also conceptually troubling. The partnership theory is
problematic when it is "taken as implying a unity of interests in marriage that does
not exist, especially in light of less than full sharing in marriages."' 154 Furthermore,
commentators have proposed regarding marriage "not simply as an economic
partnership, but as a distinctive open-ended relationship of mutuality,
interdependence, and care."'155 In other words, viewing marriage as a business
partnership robs the relationship of its core meaning of devotion and family with
the cold calculus of business principles.
C. Property Rights Recognize the Personal Value of Marriage More than
a Contract/Partnership
1.

Role in Defining Self-Identity

One of the most notable characteristics of property is its role in identifying its
possessor. Property captures something very personal and crucial about the
possessor, in a way that contracts seldom do, in rhetoric or in essence. Although
the personhood aspects of contracts have been acknowledged, 56 the fact that
people can be deeply hurt by the breaching of a contract, and that people may hold
significant non-monetary interests in the fulfillment of contracts and promises,
intuition tells us that few people are defined by the contracts they make. In fact,
"many critics have identified the move [of marriage] from status to contract as the
underlying source of problems" because the "abolition of fault and the use of
150.
151.
152.

Regan, supra note 9, at 2317 (emphasis added).
Smith, supra note 4, at 218-19.
Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689

(1990).
153.
See generally Ryznar, supra note 57. The argument is that in cases with modest assets, it is difficult to
differentiate between equal distribution and equitable distribution based purely on amounts allocated to each
spouse. However, in cases with unusually wealthy spouses (usually the husband, at the initiation of the marriage),
there is a clear difference between equal distribution-which awards the wife with much more money-and
equitable distribution.
154.
H.E. Smith, supra note 79, at 166. However, Henry Smith proceeds to note that "interestingly, more
recent partnership law does not require a complete unity of interests among partners . . . we can say that in
marriage, as in partnerships, the extent to which the marital partners' interests converge or diverge will differ
widely in individual cases." Id. at 166-67.
155.
Regan, supra note 9, at 2382.
156.

See generally Seana Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships and Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV.

481 (2008); J.E. Penner, Voluntary Obligations and the Scope of the Law of Contract,2 LEG. THEORY 325 (1996).
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'market discourse' in conceptualizing marriage" is "destructive of the values'15 of
7
caring and commitment that contributed to the stability of traditional marriage."
In contrast, possession of property has been profoundly linked to personhood
and self-definition. "One set of the individual's possessions has a special relation to
self."158 Even in the most Spartan situations,"

we find that people find things to

possess and that the spaces occupied by these things "can represent an extension of
the self and its autonomy, becoming more important as the individual foregoes
other repositories of selfhood."' 160 People who have had their identities replaced
with numbers-such as inmates or mental hospital patients-have been found to
stash objects that have little instrumental value as an attempt at maintaining a sense
of self. 161 Indeed, while the rise of private property "is explainable, among humans
as among animals first and foremost by economic considerations," it becomes
evident that property is a deep part of self-identification. 162 Among children, for
example, it turns out that:
[T]he child's awareness of self-who he or she is-is closely
related to the knowledge of what objects the child controls (that is,
owns): "I" is that which can dispose of certain objects or a certain
territory; "mine" helps define "me." To paraphrase Descartes's "I
it holds true to say of small
think, therefore I am," psychologically
163
children, "I own, therefore I am."
However, not all property is personal. Margaret Jane Radin describes the
personhood aspect of property as a spectrum. One may measure "the strength or
significance" of someone's relationship with a possession "by the kind of pain that
would be occasioned by its loss. On this view, an object is closely related to one's
personhood if its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the object's
replacement." ' '64 This can be differentiated from the type of possession where the
goods of equal market value" that one
object "is perfectly replaceable with other
' 165
reasons."
instrumental
purely
"for
holds

Scott & Scott, supra note 11, at 1227.
157.
Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates, in
158.
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 1, 2 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002).
159.
Id. (describing the Benedictine Rule for religious orders that require property dispossession, and later
that of mental patients who are institutionalized in hospitals).

160.
161.

ld. at 5.
Id.

Richard Pipes, Human Nature and the Fall of Communism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 24
162.
(Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002).
163.
Id.
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 9 (Robert C.
164.
Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Radin, Propertyand Personhood].
Id.
165.
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2. Uniqueness and Irreplaceability
Because of the difference between instrumental possessions and personal
possessions,
one should not invest oneself in the wrong way or to too great an

extent in external objects. Property is damnation as well as
salvation . . .the relationship between the shoe fetishist and his

shoe will not 166
be respected like that between the spouse and her
ring.
wedding
This personhood perspective on property promulgates a "hierarchy of
entitlements: The more closely connected with personhood, the stronger the
entitlement."'1 67 An example of something at the personal end of the continuum is a
house that someone resides in. 168 As such, eminent domain and takings
commentators frequently consider, or at the very least, make a passing reference to
the difficulty of assessing the worth of a home to a resident. 169 This is because we
understand that houses-for example, those that have been in the family for
generations upon generations, or that hold childhood memories-might hold
sentimental value to their owners that exceed the fair market price of the building
and land. The law respects these values, which is reflected in various areas of law,
0 There are few analogies
including bankruptcy. 17
to this type of legal protection for
traditional contracts.
A corollary of sentimental value is irreplaceability. Marriage is one of those
things that are considered irreplaceable. Even if a woman, after her divorce, is
made economically no worse off-and even manages to marry someone else of the

166.
Id.at 10 (emphasis in original). This is not an attempt to stretch Professor Radin's reference to the
wedding ring as actual support for viewing marriage as property; indeed, she is evidently referring to the wedding
ring as property, not marriage itself. But her example is telling-it is socially permissible to invest yourself
extensively in an object as long as it is sentimentally associated with marriage. And it is certainly consistent with
the notion that society wishes to promote investing in marriage, not only instrumentally, but sentimentally, as well.
167.
Id. at 15.
168.
Radin, Property and Personhood,supra note 164, at 15.
169.
See Frank 1.Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
'Just Compensation' Law, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 497 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002)
(describing the nature of valuation to be "imponderable and idiosyncratic," leading to "interminable wrangling
over amounts"); see also Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 164, at 17-18.
Perhaps the personhood perspective is not strong enough to outweigh other concerns,
especially the government's need to appear even-handed and the lower administrative costs
associated with simpler rules.... On the other hand, perhaps the personhood perspective is
so deeply embedded that, without focusing on the problem, we expect that the condemning
authority will take fungible property where possible. We may simply take for granted that
the government will not take homesteads when parking lots will do.
170.
See, e.g., II U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (allowing the possibility of a debtor, through reorganization, to
discharge a large amount of debt while keeping his or her house). Many states also have individual homestead
exemptions that make a debtor's place of residence off-limits for creditors.
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same marriage "market value" 17 1 as her ex-husband, we would still recognize a
clear difference between the first and second marriage. This is intuitively different
from the stereotypical contractual setting, money for widgets, where it does not
particularly matter who the opposing party is as long as the bargained-for cash or
goods are the same.
We recognize that property--or at least some types of property17 2-is very
personal, to the point of self-definition, 73 and not compensable with full market
value damage measures. Furthermore, "a more sophisticated version of property" 71is4
that "we see property as a way of defining our relationships with other people."'
Marriage is very much the same. 7 5 There is no question that marriage is supposed
to be deeply personal to the parties involved. 176 There are many self-help books on
the market about how to be in a romantic relationship without losing one's own
identity. 177 Although these books are marketed towards avoiding the succumbing of
one's self-worth and identity into a relationship, the fact that these books exist tells
us that people struggle with self-identifying through marriage. Women especially,
it seems, 178 have struggled with being so consumed in relationships that they lose
their identities.
If we conceive of a marriage like a possession, subject to a property right, it
more effectively reflects the degree of self-identification we feel. Just as society
has long understood and sympathized with the deep sentimental bonds one may
hold for his home, 179 society promotes and acknowledges the deep personal and
self-identity aspects of relationships and marriage. Contracts do not seem to offer
such a deep connection of personhood and identity. Commentators have primarily
dealt with this discrepancy by designating marriage as a special type of contract
that is especially personal, for example, delineating it as a relational contract,' 80 or
171.
For example, whatever makes a spouse desirable to another spouse. Professor Cohen has noted that it is
difficult for divorced women to remarry because women "in general lose value in the marriage market relative to
men over time." See Cohen, supranote 2, at 273.
172.
See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 164, at 10.
See Goffman, supranote 158, at 2; Pipes, supra note 162, at 24.
173.
174.

Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling. Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist

Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 28,30 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002).
175.

See, e.g., Andrew J. Weigert & Ross Hastings, Identity Loss, Family, and Social Change, 82 AM. J.

Soc. 1171-85 (1977); OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 272 (Bernhard Tauchnitz ed., 1908) ("Of
course married life is merely a habit, a bad habit. But then one regrets the loss even of one's worst habits. Perhaps
one regrets them the most. They are such an essential part of one's personality.").
This claim requires no citation, even in the legal world.
176.
177.

See, e.g., ALTHEA J. HORNER, BEING AND LOVING: HOW TO ACHIEVE INTIMACY WITH ANOTHER

PERSON AND RETAIN ONE'S OWN IDENTITY (Jason Aronson ed., 3d ed. 2005). There are many more self-help
books similar to this on the market.
See, e.g., HENRIK IBSEN, A DOLL'S HOUSE, Act Ill (Dover Publications 1992) (1879) ("1 have been
178.
performing tricks for you, Torvald. That's how I've survived. You wanted it like that. You and Papa have done me
a great wrong. It's because of you I've made nothing of my life.").
See generally MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (Scribner Books 2007) (1936) (where
179.
Scarlett O'Hara repeatedly returns to her family's plantation, Tara); DAPHNE DU MAURIER, REBECCA (Harper
Paperbacks 1997) (1938) (where both Mr. and Mrs. de Winter are very attached to their West Country estate,
Manderley).
180.

See generally Scott & Scott, supra note 11, at 1230.

Relational contract theory largely resolves this puzzle. The marriage vows express the
couple's emotional commitment and use hortatory language to emphasize the seriousness of
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by enunciating a special focus on promises between intimates. 18 Rather than
categorizing marriage as a special type of contract, with many exceptions and
differences from the prototypical contract, we can more smoothly categorize
marriage as property, entailing the type
of personhood and identity concerns that
82
have long been attributed to property.
3. Possession as a Signal
As mentioned supra, "possession" is an ambiguous term. Yet for the common
law, possession is the origin of property.' 83 Carol Rose examines Pierson v. Post'84
and extracts "two great principles, seemingly at odds, for defining possession: (1)
notice to the world through a clear act, and (2) reward to useful labor.' 85 She
suggests that the two principles are not actually at odds, but that "in rewarding the
one who communicates a claim[,]" the common law "does reward useful labor; the
useful labor is the very act of speaking clearly and distinctly about one's claim to
property."' 186 Thus, the signaling aspect of possession seems increasingly
important. 817 Adverse possession, public records for property, saving one's place in
line at a movie theater, or leaving a chair in a shoveled street parking spot are all
unambiguous ways of signaling possession. 88
What does this mean for marriage? Entering into marriage has a signaling
function as well. It has often been noted that today, couples "can live together in
intimate relationships" without social sanction and that this type of cohabitation
can be "undertaken and discarded with far less cost than marriage," while retaining
"a greater measure of personal freedom" for each partner.1 89 If the benefits of
the undertaking. They describe a standard of performance in idealized and general terms,
and remind the parties of their goal of maintaining a caring, cooperative relationship.
181.
See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 156, at 497. ("An account of promising should treat promises within
friendly and intimate relationships as central, though not exclusive, cases.").
182.
183.

See generally Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 164.
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 180, 181

(Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002).
184.
3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
185.

Rose, supranote 183, at 182.

186.
187.

Id. at 184.
Id. at 183-84.
Possession as the basis of property ownership, then, seems to amount to something like
yelling loudly enough to all who may be interested .... Similar ideas of the importance of
communication, or as it is more commonly called, 'notice,' are implicit in our recording
statutes and in a variety of other devices that force a property claimant to make a public
record of her claims on pain of losing them altogether. Indeed, notice plays a part in the
most mundane property-like claims to things that the law does not even recognize as
capable of being reduced to ownership ... it is so important that property owners make and
keep their communications clear.

188.

Id. at 184.

189.

Scott & Scott, supra note 11, at 1254.

At first glance, it would seem that most of the functions and purposes of marriage could be
achieved through an informal cohabitation relationship. No formal status or commitment is
needed for a relationship that includes sexual intimacy, mutual companionship, the sharing
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sexual intimacy, shared income and assets, mutual support, companionship,
company, and children can all be realized through cohabitation, why is marriage
still a very popular institution? It is because the people who marry "expect to
benefit from undertaking a greater commitment than is possible through other,
informal options."' 190 Like the lawn chair occupying a parking spot in Chicago, or a
land record filed with the proper authorities, entering into marriage provides a
signal:
The signaling function of marriage (as distinct from a cohabitation
agreement) serves to reveal a person's preferences toward intimate
relationships in which he or she may wish to become involved.
Preferences about long-term relationships are likely to vary widely.
Parties can be expected to differ on the desired length of the term
of the relationship, the degree of sexual loyalty expected from their
principal partner, and the desired level of commitment to the
relationship generally. Given this diversity of preference, the legal
category of marriage conveys a signal to prospective partners of
the signalers' preferences as to the nature of the relationship.
Permitting individual parties the freedom to choose from among
many varied forms of commitment will inevitably dilute the
informational value of the signal.191
Under today's no-fault divorce law regime, couples cannot contract each other
out of the possibility of divorce. Even though the spouses are saying, "for richer or
for poorer, in sickness and in health" at the ceremony, there is no way for one to
legally bind oneself to this vow in a legally accountable sense. 192 Because "couples
are not free to substitute legal mechanisms to reinforce their commitment," the law
is essentially choosing ex post autonomy over ex ante autonomy. This "has
particularly acute costs in an environment in which extralegal mechanisms function
suboptimally... captured most forcefully in the mandatory unilateral termination
rule" and the problem of asymmetric investments between the spouses. 193 Thus,
conceptualizing marriage as property re-words Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott's
critique of no-fault divorce laws but does so by characterizing the problem as one
of adequate signaling-signaling in property rhetoric.
of assets and income, the production and rearing of children, and the provision of care and
support (both emotional and financial) in times of need.
190.
Id. at 1255. The authors add that, "The essence of this commitment is constraint. To be sure, many
friendships and cohabitation relationships involve a sense of commitment. Marriage, however, adds an overlay of
legal and social sanctions that further restrict the freedom to renege and thus strengthen each partner's
commitment."
191.
Id.at 1261.
192.
There are ways for spouses to increase the accountability factor. For example, consider a spouse who
wants to bind himself-I am referring to him as male for convenience, without loss of generality-even though
both he and his wife knows that he can divorce her in the future. He could write a prenuptial agreement that would
be overwhelmingly to her favor, or otherwise try to place himself in a vulnerable position such that a divorce
would harm him more than her. However, this might undercut the aspect of trust in the marriage.
193.
Scott & Scott, supranote 1I,at 1334.
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D. Toward a More Sensitive Measure of Remedy
Modeling marriage as a property right-rather than as a contract right or a right
to a share of a business partnership-better captures the way courts can equitably
divide assets upon divorce. The economic language of contract and partnership
imply that bright-line rules should be used rather than flexible standards. This is
incorrect in practice 94 and it overlooks the personal and sensitive nature of
individual marriages. In contrast, a property approach to marriage does not
visualize property allocation upon divorce as a type of damages-to be calculated
by expectation or some other equation. In order to illuminate the way the model of
marriage can affect the remedy afforded to the spouses upon divorce, consider the
three cases below. In each case, the aggrieved spouse financially and emotionally
supported the other spouse through college to receive an educational degree. The
three courts take very different approaches to dividing the asset-the educational
degree-upon divorce.
1. No Award to the Aggrieved Spouse-The Roberts Rule
In the case of In re Marriage of Roberts,195 the couple was married in 1989.
The following year, they mutually decided that the husband would attend
Valparaiso University Law School, while the wife would work to support both of
97
them. 96 The husband did quite well, graduated, and filed a petition for divorce.'
The court determined that a law degree is not property because it does not possess
the common characteristics of property.' 98 It is a piece of paper with no value
except for what the holder wishes to pursue with it, conditioned on the holder's
own choices and talents. 99 There seemed to be too much uncertainty about the
value of the degree, and even if there was no uncertainty, the court feared that any
award would ultimately result in an award beyond the actual physical assets of the
marriage. 2°° However, the court did decide that the enhanced earning potential
could be considered in the calculation for spousal maintenance. 2° 1 At the point the
case was decided, the husband had just graduated and begun working, so they
probably had very few assets to divide.2 °2 So considering the large economic value
of a law degree over time, this was probably small consolation to the wife.
This decision is objectionable on two grounds. First, our moral intuition tells us
that we want the wife to be compensated for the law degree, considering her
sacrifices and considering how soon after graduation the husband filed for
194.
In America, at least, divorce courts split property equitably-considering a variety of factors including
need, misconduct, and contributions, often depending on state statute.
195.
670 N.E.2d 72 (1996).
196.
Id. at 74.
197.
The opinion notes that the husband graduated third in his class and served as editor-in-chief of law
review. After he graduated, he began working with a large law firm in Chicago. Id.
198.
Id. at 75-76.
199.
Id. at 75.
200.
Id. at 76.
201.
Id.
202.
Id. at 74.
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divorce.20 3 Moral intuition is especially relevant here because in divorce settings,
we do not see the kind of bargaining in the shadow of informal norms as we do in
other settings. 204 As a result, itis important that we consider what the law is doing
to those who are morally wronged.20 5 Second, from an economic point of view, the
Roberts rule encourages opportunism in marriage because the wife gets nothing if
the couple splits up. This provides an incentive for spouses not to support each
other through marriage, which may have the effect of reducing overall utility of the
marriage for the couple.
2. Restitution-The Postema Rule
In Postema v. Postema,20 6 which also concerned a law degree, the court
determined that the degree would be considered a marital asset because both
spouses worked for it together-the husband in law school and the wife in her
contributions.20 7 The court awarded the wife a fixed sum that represented her
contribution to her husband's acquirement of the degree.20 a In other words, the
court turned to a theory of restitution.20 9 A two-step analysis is required: first, an

See Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 10, at 335. Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron conducted an
203.
empirical experiment concerning moral intuitions about divorce in modem society. They found that, despite the
"no-fault" regime, subjects still felt strongly that their moral intuitions about fault should be applied.
Inthese experiments, we see that many people's instinct is to punish, or at least disfavor,
wrongdoers. Subjects expressed distress that, under the no-fault law, parties can breach a
contract without repercussions.... Subjects also worried that the permissible consideration
of contributions should actually include contributions to the relationship itself, a factor
excluded under the no-fault laws: 'No-fault may make things simpler, but why award one
party equal proceeds when the relationship was never equal to begin with. If you're going to
court, time should be given to evaluating each person's contribution to a relationship and
compromising.' And, perhaps most commonly, the restriction of the law made subjects
angry or frustrated: 'In this case, the no fault is for the birds. Sam was ignorant in thinking
he could get his own way once he was married.' And, in fact, we know that more than a
third of subjects in experiment 3 were willing to intentionally go against the legal rule in
order to punish the wrongdoer, presumably when they determined that the law would yield
an unfair result. This was somewhat surprising given that the instructions asked subjects to
respond from the point of view of an impartial judge following no-fault rules, but some
subjects apparently thought the judge would concur.
204.

See, e.g., ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).

205.

See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 10, at 336.
If everyone agreed that fault is important and the law is unreasonable, divorcing parties
could make contracts with one another in accord with their shared moral intuitions .... Our
results suggest that this is not the case, even though the norm prohibiting marital
misconduct appears to be quite universal. Subjects are certainly attuned to the informal
norm, but they will turn to the legal rule when it is to their benefit to do so.

471 N.W.2d 912 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
206.
Id.
207.
Id. at 916.
208.
See Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principleof Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX.
209.
L. REV. 2083 (2001). Emily Sherwin notes that "[r]estitution is now acknowledged to be a component of our law,
and unjust enrichment is generally understood to be the guiding principle of the field of restitution." Id.at
2083-84. She also notes that,
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examination of the sacrifices, efforts, and contributions of the nonstudent spouse
toward attainment of the degree. 2 10 Second, given such sacrifices, efforts, and
contributions, a determination of what remedy or means of compensation would
most equitably compensate the nonstudent spouse under the facts of the case. 2" An
implication of this remedy is that women would be compensated for their sacrifices
during marriage. Because women tend to make the sacrifices and contribute earlier
on in marriage, while men tend to do so later, this type of award helps prevent the
kind of opportunism that has concerned commentators. 1 2 On the other hand, it is
very difficult to calculate the value of non-monetary contributions. It has been
argued that such calculations also, by nature, demean the contributions because
market-rhetoric undermines the value of housework and care. 2 3 Furthermore, it is
unclear whether the amount recoverable under a restitution theory is the adequate
amount of money to deter opportunism.
3. Expectation Damages-The O'Brien Ruling
21 4
Contrast the Roberts and Postema rulings with that of O'Brien v. O'Brien.
The court in O'Brien, like the court in Postema, ruled that the advanced degree is a
marital asset.215 However, the court likened the situation to determining the
valuation of lost earning potential in a wrongful death tort lawsuit.21 6 It awarded

the principle of unjust enrichment can be understood in at least three ways. First, unjust
enrichment can be interpreted as a principle of Aristotelian equity, providing correction
when normally sound rules produce unjust results in particular cases. Second, unjust
enrichment can be characterized as a 'legal principle' incorporating a broad ideal of justice,
from which courts can deduce solutions to particular restitution problems. Finally, unjust
enrichment can be understood simply as expressing a common theme of restitution cases.
id, at 2084. Sherwin also notes that she prefers conceptualizing unjust enrichment as a descriptive and
organizational idea, because seeing it as a legal principle would "encourage judicial creativity" and her "own
instincts about the ideal pace of legal change, particularly in private law, are conservative." Id. at 2113. The court
in Postema does not make clear what theory of restitution or unjust enrichment it is operating under. However, it
does hold that the spouse who does not earn the degree should be compensated whenever the degree is the end
product of a concerted family effort involving mutual sacrifice and effort. 471 N.W.2d at 917.
210.
See Postema, 471 N.W.2d 912.
211.
Id.
212.
See, e.g., Cohen, supranote 2, at 287.
The shift in relative values between men and women over time has an important role to play
in the formation of the marriage contract. At the time of formation, the marriage contract
promises gains to both the parties who enter into it. Yet the period of time over which these
gains are realized is not symmetrical. As a rule, men tend to obtain gains early in the
relationship when their own contributions to the marriage are relatively low and that of their
wives relatively great. Similarly, later on in marriage women tend as a general rule to obtain
more from the contract than do men. The creation of this long-term imbalance provides the
opportunity for strategic behavior whereby one of the parties, generally the man, might find
it in his interest to breach the contract unless otherwise constrained.
213.
See, e.g., Regan, supra note 9, at 2310 ("Reliance on property rhetoric thus creates the risk that
caregivers who do not conform to this model will be further marginalized and their claims deemed even less
worthy of financial recognition.").
214.
489 N.E.2d 712, 713 (1985).
215.
Id.; see Postema, 471 N.W.2d 912.
216.
O'Brien, 489 N.E. 2d at 718.
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damages to the nonstudent spouse not only for the reimbursement of direct
financial contributions she made but also the value of the enhanced earning
capacity it afforded the degree-holder. This is analogous to expectation damages.
Of the three cases, the ruling in this case offers the most incentives for spouses to
make sacrifices for each other's careers, but it restricts the freedom of the degreeholding spouse more strictly post-divorce. 1 7
4. Analysis of Remedies
The different ways that courts have tackled how to treat advanced degrees
upon divorce reveal the ways they conceptualize marriage. The no-award ruling in
Roberts essentially held couples to their sacrifices during marriage, providing a
disincentive for the supporting spouse. 1 8 The restitution award in Postema
provided a little more incentive for the supporting spouse to make sacrifices for her
husband's education but is a remedy that is difficult to calculate. 2 19 Lastly, the
expectation damages award in O'Brien provided high incentives for spouses to
contribute to each other but restricts the ex-post freedom of the degree-holder.2 °
None of the rulings discussed above are based on fault. Instead, the courts were
attempting to make sense of the institution of marriage. We see that, unlike in
contracts, there is no true "meeting of minds," and expectation damages are not the
default.
By conceptualizing marriage as a property right, courts can approach the
question of the advanced degree under a new framework. Instead of visualizing an
imaginary contract that was breached-an imaginary contract without clear
consideration and bargained-for benefits-and trying to sculpt a remedy of
expectation or restitution into that contract, courts can recognize the spouse of
having been deprived of a property right that was formerly hers.
We have already established above that a property rule is not the correct way to
protect this property right because of the problems with forcing spouses into
unwanted marriages with each other. So this becomes more analogous to a case
where someone is deprived of their property right-for example, replevin-but
there is no way to return the property, like when a thief loses or destroys the stolen
object. The claim here then becomes one of something like trover. When we think
of the court's work this way, they are essentially calculating the lost marriage to
the spouse and the amount of money that marriage was worth. It is in calculating
this value that it makes sense for courts to consider equitable factors-the way they
do in practice.
For individual assets to be divided, courts may turn to different remediesrestitution, expectation damages, etc. But they do this only to further the general
cause of calculating the amount of the lost property right of marriage to not only
217.
It is very difficult to calculate the future value of an advanced degree. Furthermore, when the court
awards installments of payments, it limits the degree-holder's choices in his or her career.
218.
See Roberts, 670 N.E.2d at 77-78.
219.
See Postema, 471 N.W.2d at 104.
220.
See O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 716.
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the aggrieved spouse, but to both spouses. This pulls us out of the contracts
framework, or the partnership framework, because in America, divorce courts are
not candidly awarding remedies that are consistent with contracts (expectation
damages) 22 or partnership dissolutions 222 in any case.
When partnerships or contracts dissolve, courts generally apply straightforward
calculations of damages according to formulaic rules. This does not reflect the way
courts do (and should) allocate property when a marriage fails. In contrast, when
someone loses property, courts must evaluate the value of the property, which leads
to a more open-ended and personal remedial measure.
V. CONCLUSION

Commentators have modeled marriage as a monarchy, a democracy, a
commitment, a status, a tort-doctrine-like duty, a promise, a contract, and a
partnership. Currently, the most popular are the contract and partnership models.
Yet both of these models lack consistency in view of modem no-fault divorce.
This article has offered a new way to think about marriage. The evolution into
no-fault divorce laws renders many of the old models of marriage problematic.
This property model is more consistent with our conception and treatment of
marriage and divorce as compared to other models. It captures the personhood
aspect of marriage. In terms of remedial options, it is not only more sensitive
toward the sensitive aspects of divorce but is a more accurate reflection of what
courts are doing in practice. Furthermore, it facilitates a smoother transition from
pre-1800 to now. Rather than picking a series of disjointed models (Status,
Commitment, Duty, Contract, Partnership), it can present a smooth transition from
inalienable property to alienable property, changing along with society's
psychological and social values.
Making sense of what marriage is will lead us to a more sensible idea of what
divorce allocations should look like. Modem conceptions of no-fault divorce have
bred widespread criticism and moral objections. 3 Conceptualizing marriage as a
property right solves the notional problems with the contract and partnership
models, such as, the fact that couples do not truly bargain for the legally binding
aspects of marriage and instead recite completely non-binding vows. This
conception not only accurately reflects what courts do in practice today, but it gives
them room to develop in the future a way that is nuanced, personal, and equitably
directed at spouses.

221.
Commentators have pointed out that no one knows what expectation damages would be, anyway,
because couples are essentially promising "for better or for worse" that they would stay together. How can one
value a lifetime of love? See also Part IV.B.I.
222.
See Part IV.B.2.
223.
See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supranote 10, at 335.
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